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ABSTRACT
Questions: Can there be a selective explanation for suicide? Or are all suicides evolutionary
mistakes, ever pruned by natural selection to the extent that the tendency to perform them is
heritable?
Model: A simple variant of trait group selection (where a population is divided into mutually
exclusive groups, with the direct effects of behaviour limited to group-mates), employing
predators as the mechanism underlying group selection. Predators evaluate groups to avoid
potentially suicidal defenders (which, when present, limit a predator’s net return), thus acting as
a group selection mechanism favouring groups with potentially suicidal altruists.
Conclusion: The model supports contingent strong altruism (depressing one’s direct
reproduction – absolute fitness – to aid others) without kin assortment. Even an extreme
contingent suicidal type (destroying self for the sake of others) may either saturate a population
or be polymorphic with a type avoiding such altruism. The model does not, however, support
a sterile worker caste, where sterility occurs before life-history events associated with
effective altruism; under random assortment, reproductive suicide must remain contingent or
facultative.
Keywords: contingent strong altruism, correlated strategy, predation, random assortment,
suicidal altruism, trait group selection, weak altruism.
Independent thought calls for courage, because it dispenses with the protection
and comfort of consensus-creating prejudices. [Rüdiger Safranski, on Martin
Heidegger’s Party allegiance and assumption of rectorship in Nazi Germany
(Safranski, 1998, p. 245)]
How many deaths make this life? How many lives this death? A complementarity
principle we assiduously avoid. (Benjamin Suzuki)
INTRODUCTION
We do have an explanation for why only one individual reproduces in many ant colonies:
kin selection. We do understand self-sacrifice for relatives, for family. But suicidal altruism
among non-relatives? Well, it also happens, most noticeably in warfare, perhaps even in the
mind of the suicide bomber.
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Suicide is cultural taboo in the United States, as is rape. Sociobiologists speaking of rape
must always preface with the apology that explanation is not advocacy (e.g. Thornhill and Palmer,
2000). Curiously, sociobiological constructs of murder are not so guilt ridden as those
of rape. Perhaps this is because murder is so widespread among other species that it is
difficult to view murder as a special human behaviour. For example, langur males practise
infanticide (Hausfater and Hrdy, 1984; van Schaik and Janson, 2000).
Suicide is taboo beyond murder and rape. Suicide we frame as utterly inefficacious,
the sole exceptions, as remarked, among relatives and the strange case of war. Suicide
outside these is, a priori, an impossible, monstrous deviation (Atran, 2003; Asad, 2007) – caused
by mistake, ever pruned by natural selection.
There are evolutionary models for murder and rape, but not for altruistic suicide among
non-relatives. We provide one herein. We do it not to explain phenomena such as the suicide
bomber, but to plumb the essence of suicidal altruism among non-relatives with a very
simple evolutionary model. We do claim that the cultural taboo against efficacious, adaptive
suicide among non-relatives has no place in present evolutionary thought. Our model is
biological, abstract, unrelated to political process. Our goal? To enable others to approach
the malaise of irrational death.
SUICIDAL ALTRUISM AMONG NON-RELATIVES
THROUGH GROUP SELECTION
Classical evolutionary thought views true altruism – foregoing reproduction while augment-
ing the reproduction of another – as unsupportable under random assortment (Wilson, 1975,
1977b, 1980; Cohen and Eshel, 1976; Matessi and Jayakar, 1976; Nunney, 1985; Hadany et al., 2006). But altruism may
also be ‘weak’ sensu Wilson (1979), and that can be supported under random assortment.
A weak altruist is one that may aid others but in so doing also enhances its own absolute
fitness. Darwin’s (1859) ‘special difficulty’, the sterile social insect worker caste, and similarly
extreme, reproductively suicidal altruism (e.g. Wickler, 1976; McAllister and Roitberg, 1987; Stern and Foster,
1996; Shibao et al., 2004), remain the purview of kin assortment and will not be treated here.
We present a simple variant of trait group selection (Wilson, 1975, 1977b, 1980) supporting
reproductive suicide, but not a fully formed sterile caste, under random assortment. Prior,
more restrictive conclusions have been constrained by how behavioural strategies were
defined. Instanced altruistic strategies are usually assumed to be behaviourally independent
of one another; individuals are autonomous in realized strategy play. We, however, will
employ correlated strategies, which allow intra-group behaviour to be correlated across
individuals (Rosenthal, 1974; Hammerstein, 1981; Aumann, 1987; Rissing et al., 1989; Cripps, 1991; Myerson, 1991;
Pollock, 1994b, 1995, 1996; Pollock et al., 2004; Hadany et al., 2006), so that the expression of a trait in one
individual suppresses similar expression among group-mates (Kukuk et al., 1998; Rissing et al., 1989,
1996; Pollock et al., 2004; Hadany et al., 2006). Abandoning such intra-group individual autonomy in
behaviour significantly expands the scope of altruism under trait group selection. Yet the
conclusions of foundational trait group selection are necessary for the construction of the
present suicide-supporting model. In prior terminology, ‘strong altruism’ (harming one’s
absolute fitness to aid another) under random assortment requires, in a sense, concurrent
‘weak altruism’ (sensu Wilson, 1979). Kin selection, in contrast, supports strong altruism
(of which reproductive suicide is the most extreme kind) even in the absence of concurrent
weak altruism.
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THE MODEL
A trait group population is an infinite haploid, asexual population subdivided into an
infinite number of trait groups (wherein behavioural effects are expressed), each with K
individuals assorting randomly from the entire population at group formation (Wilson, 1975,
1977b, 1980). These groups are ephemeral; after social interaction, individuals disperse, again
randomly, reproduce, and die. Their offspring begin the cycle anew.
We focus on the strongest form of altruism possible, suicidal defence against predators
that enhances the survival of others. A model supporting such altruism will clearly support
weaker forms where the altruist is allowed positive fitness. Consider two haploid types:
a contingently suicidal S that may defend its group-mates to the death, thereby augmenting
the latter’s chances of survival; and a null N-type that avoids such behaviour. We will
also consider, briefly, variants of N that – though they remain fundamentally self-oriented –
try to mimic the S-type.
The contingent nature of suicide in S is crucial. S has the capacity to commit suicide in
defence of others but need not do so. An inevitably suicidal S would clearly fail to persist
(cf. Pollock et al., 2004).
Our model supposes that trait groups are subject to predation. If a predator appears, one
and only one S in a group always becomes suicidal, thereby retarding the predator’s net
success. All others, both S-types and N-types, attempt escape. So S is a ‘correlated strategy’
(Rosenthal, 1974; Aumann, 1987; Cripps, 1991; Myerson, 1991; Pollock, 1994b, 1995, 1996; Pollock et al., 2004): some
external event, beyond the control of individual S’s, determines which S becomes suicidal.
Moreover, the actions of S’s within groups are inversely correlated (e.g. Pollock and Rissing, 1995;
Kukuk et al., 1998; Rissing et al., 1989), with the intra-group frequency of suicide often less than the
intra-group frequency of S (in fact, always so when a group contains two or more S,
because only one becomes suicidal). For example, S’s might forage or otherwise display/
roam near the boundary of the group; the coordination event determining suicide would
then be the (random) invasion path taken by a predator. The S closest to that path would
be the one to hinder the predator by means of a suicidal attack.
Our model is abstract, and assumes that such a mechanism inversely correlating
the phenotypic expression of S exists. Whatever the details of this mechanism, S’s
expose themselves to predation risk conspicuously, while N’s do not. In addition, an S’s
self-exposure is real, reducing its chance of survival if it attacks.
At first we assume that an S not attacked has the same fitness as a group-mate N (risk is
probability of attack, not realized attack); we relax this condition later. We also assume that
realized suicides are always effective for group-mates; that is, if a predator encounters a
suicide, the probability that other group members (both N and S) survive is ρS, whereas
if there is no suicidal attack during predation, all members experience survival probability
ρN, with ρS > ρN.
There are three ways to interpret ρX. A successful predator might destroy the whole
group, with (1 − ρX) the probability of group extinction. Alternatively, ρX might be each
group member’s independent probability of survival (sans suicide) – a predator might get
all, none or anything in between. Lastly, (1 − ρX) might be the exact proportion of members
culled by the predator. In the latter two cases, predation need not be independent across
group-mates. In particular, those nearest the predator would more likely fall victim
concurrently. If such are disproportionately S-types, we would have to reinterpret terms
a bit, but our qualitative conclusions would remain.
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We assume that a predator (or group of predators) prefers capture of multiple prey when
attacking a group. Thus the rest of the prey group would not be guaranteed escape during
the predator’s first attack. But an attack forced to occur on the periphery (periphery defined
as entry point(s) of the predator(s)) by a suicide (who must be an S-type) provides others
greater opportunity for escape; in effect, a suicide throws itself at the predator, slowing it
down. An N on the periphery would not do this, but try to escape. In fact, and this will be
important shortly, an N prefers to avoid the periphery in the first place, shielded within the
relative safety of the group’s interior, or at least reducing its distance from group-mates.
Our predator is an active selection agent. It ‘knows’ all about S’s, and would prefer to
avoid them. Such an active selective agent is essential to the model. More passive selection
will support neither suicide nor weaker forms of strong altruism under random assortment.
Since groups are of size K, a predator attacking a group lacking S-types gets a pay-off
(group members killed) of K(1 − ρN). Groups with an S-type (remembering that exactly one
S goes suicidal) yield 1 + (K − 1)(1 − ρS), the suicide for certain plus some group-mates.
Predators prefer to avoid S-types only if
K(1 − ρN) > 1 + (K − 1)(1 − ρS)
or (1)
K(ρS − ρN) > ρS.
If a predator cannot differentiate groups by number of S’s, then we shall show shortly that
S cannot persist under random assortment. But in our model, a predator may indeed have
information about the presence of S, because S’s inherently tend to occur on the periphery
of groups. We shall see that such foreknowledge may allow S to persist in evolutionary time.
If a predator detects an S, it may go elsewhere. If the group has several such S’s, it is more
likely to detect one, increasing the probability that it goes elsewhere. But a predator must
decide to attack some group sometime, so a group may be attacked even though a predator
has detected an S.
To model predator choice across groups, we impose a bit more structure on the
population. Not only are groups formed randomly, they are paired randomly against
predators who must decide to attack only one of each pair. Group selection is zero sum
within predator pairings; one group will be attacked, the other not. Alternatively, one group
is attacked precisely because the other – paired – group is not. Standard trait group selection
has each group contribute independently to the reproductive pool. Here, however, one
group’s full contribution to that pool is purchased through the reduced success of its pair
(which is preyed upon). Such ‘strong group selection’ (e.g. Pollock and Rissing, 1995; sensu Wilson, 1990)
will be essential.
A group with peripheral S’s signals the presence of potential suicides. The more S’s there
are, the stronger the signal and the more likely the predator detects it. For simplicity, we
assume a predator either detects a signal or not. It does not evaluate the strength of signals
across paired groups. (Relative evaluation of signal quality would skew selection in favour
of S, as predators would then preferentially avoid that group with more S. The detect/
non-detect dichotomy thus provides a conservative bias against finding cases in which S
persists.) Choice is random if no signal is detected. When one group is silent (a group may
be perceived silent while containing S’s) and the other is not, the predator pounces on
the silent group. If both groups emit a signal, the predator is indifferent, again choosing
randomly, for it cannot then avoid the suicidal defence.
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Since predation events are paired across groups in a zero-sum way, selection is directed to
a proper subset of groups throughout the population – as already noted, a deviation from
foundational trait group selection (Wilson, 1975, 1980) that is essential for our results. Such
‘truncated (trait) group selection’ (sensu D.S. Wilson, personal communication) intensifies selection
locally based on group phenotypic differences. Groups with some lesser sampled attribute
endure reduced fitness relative to other sampled groups (here, sampled in pairs). The former
groups are truncated, either removed from the population or their contribution to the future
reproductive pool is depressed, while the latter are untouched. Original trait group selection
posits that all selection occurs after group dispersal, selection then measured as population
relative fitness of morphs summed across all groups. In our model, however, groups without
some (sampled) attribute are differentially eliminated or have their fitness reduced relative
to those exhibiting the (sampled) attribute. In standard trait group selection, the absolute
fitness of a group (however composed) is solely an intra-group affair; in truncated trait
group selection, the absolute fitness of one group may differ depending on the attributes of
other groups, mediated by predator avoidance of recognized peripheral S’s. Wilson’s (1975,
1977b, 1979, 1980) advocacy of group selection began, as was fitting, with the weakest form of
group selection possible. Here we augment group selection in trait groups by employing
what we believe to be a plausible mechanism – predators that are concerned with making
their own living and need to evaluate prey susceptibility to do so.
Let i denote the number of S in a group and hi be the probability that the predator detects
the S signal in that group. Then, hi ≥ hj for i > j. h0 = 0. If the paired groups have i, j potential
suicidals respectively, the probability that the former group escapes attack when matched
with the latter, αi, j, is
αi, j = (1 − hi)(1 − hj)/2 + hi(1 − hj) + (hihj)/2. (2)
We can now present simple emergence and stability conditions for S.
Emergence of S
Consider an individual S in a large population consisting almost entirely of N-type indi-
viduals. S almost always experiences a group where its K − 1 group-mates are all N, while its
paired group contains only N. To persist, its expected fitness must be greater than that of the
average N individual (Nunney, 1985; Pollock, 1988, 1994b, 1996). If the predator chooses the group with
the S, that S must die. S has positive fitness only if both its groups avoid the predator. So its
fitness is α1,0 = (1 − h1)/2 + h1 = (1 + h1)/2, since h0 = 0 (equation 2). As the population is
assumed large, to a first approximation average N experiences a group of all N, with its
group similarly paired against another all N group. The predator is indifferent between two
all N groups so a focal N in such a pairing enjoys an expected pay-off of (1 + ρN)/2.
Rare S may be thought of as a focal N mutating to S, with this S increasing in frequency
if it does better than its pre-mutation state (e.g. Nunney, 1985; Pollock, 1988, 1994b, 1996). S is thus
successful only if (1 + h1)/2 > (1 + ρN)/2 or just h1 > ρN. The latter inequality says that the
probability of being detected must exceed the no-suicide probability of survival during an
attack. The greater the predation threat, the less conspicuous S need be. If the predator is
always indifferent to the S-signal, S will fail because its success then requires ½ > (1 + ρN)/2
or 0 > ρN. The predator is therefore a mechanism of group selection. Individual selection on
the predator determines group selection on its prey.
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Predator sensitivity to S
How can the predator know that peripheral display by prey produces an obstacle worth
avoiding? Before S evolves, what supports predator signal discrimination? We give two
answers. The periphery may be unavoidable for some (Hamilton, 1971), with our predator
subject to selection for discrimination independent of the existence of S. That is, the
predator has already learned that stragglers should be avoided for maximal return. Rare S
would then appear just to be another case of an unfortunate lot, with the predator primed
for wariness. But S chooses the periphery rather than being forced there via intra-group
competition (Hamilton, 1971; West Eberhard, 1978; Pollock, 1994b, 1996; Reeve, 2000); it actively engages
the predator just prior to defeat. Such an S voluntarily assumes ‘weakness’ to discourage
predators, so periphery display is weakly altruistic (Wilson, 1979), helping group-mates more
than self, if predators sometimes detect the signal and avoid the group. Somewhat strangely,
group competitive inferiors, if forced to the periphery, can transform themselves into weak
altruists by becoming conspicuous failures (Pollock, 1996).
Alternatively, imagine two prey species linked by a common predator. One species
may undergo regular kin assortment, supporting some sort of suicidal defence in the
usual kin selective sense. The predator entrains on prey signalling, detecting potential
suicides engendered by kin selection. Kin assortment need not be absolute, but might be
mediated by distance (Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000). The second species assorts randomly but –
enduring the same predators – is thereby exposed to latent group selection, realized upon
a mutation to S. Even more simply, a population originally under kin assortment
might switch to random assortment and retain contingent suicide, assuming that the
condition h1 > ρN (or something a bit weaker – see below) is met, ensuring at least poly-
morphism in S and N. Spatial proximity employing kin selection (Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000)
can become simple trait group selection (altered for spatial dispersal) if pedigree distance
increases through dispersal and invasion. Alternatively, generalization away from kin
selection might be no more than an extension of parental care. Consider bird mobbing.
Parents will attack potential predators near their young. This aggressive display might
be generalized to display irrespective of nestlings, providing benefit to a non-kin group.
What we call ‘periphery display’ might already be employed in natural history, the predator
thus familiar with its effect. Predator sensitivity to a previously evolved prey defence
seems a reasonable pre-adaptation for our model. Finally, many predators are able to learn.
Sensitivity to S-display in a long-lived, localized predator can then be instantaneous in
evolutionary time.
Saturation of S
Suppose rare N appears in a population that is otherwise S. The average S experiences a
world where predators are indifferent. If its group is attacked, it becomes suicidal with
probability 1/K. It escapes predation with probability ρS when one of its group-mates has
become suicidal. Average S’s expected fitness is therefore
(1 + (ρS)(K − 1)/K)/2.
Rare N’s expected fitness is (from equation 2)
αK − 1, K + (1 − αK − 1, K)ρS.
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So N can persist when
αK − 1, K + (1 − αK − 1, K)ρS > (1 + (ρS)(K − 1)/K)/2
or (3)
2 αK − 1, K > 1 − ρS /(K(1 − ρS)).
So S may resist invasion by N even when survival after realized suicide (ρS) approaches
zero. Resistance succeeds so long as K(ρS − ρN) > ρS is satisfied (equation 1). There is here a
tension between group size, K, and these two conditions. Larger group size makes equation
(3) less likely, but predator discrimination more likely (equation 1). Smaller group size
makes S saturation more likely, while predator discrimination becomes less likely. The
condition for S success, h1 > ρN, may hold although saturation fails, and that combination
ensures polymorphism in S and N. We thus expect S to succeed over a greater parameter
space in larger groups but often only polymorphically so.
Recall that rare S survives only when avoiding predation, thereby refraining from suicide.
Under true polymorphism, some S in a preyed group will not become suicidal as there is
only one sacrificial S per group preyed upon. The condition h1 > ρN is thus overly stringent
for sustained polymorphism once the initial hurdle is surpassed.
Polymorphism may predominate for an additional reason. Continual predator scanning
involves a cost. So predators should be less willing to scan once S is near saturation.
High-frequency S may then select for predator indifference, allowing N to persist when rare.
Overall, polymorphism seems to be the most likely evolutionary outcome.
Suicide requiring kin selection
Our suicide model requires a coordination event (e.g. direction of predator attack) that
differentiates S into two forms, and a mechanism (predator choice) that differentiates
groups by probable frequency of S (revealed by pre-suicide periphery display), imposing a
zero-sum outcome (predator choice) correlated inversely with this intra-group frequency.
Prior models allow differential genotypic response under kin selection. Wilson (1977a)
provides an excellent example of coordination under kin selection leading to contingent
suicide in the trematode parasite Dicrocoelium dendriticum (Wickler, 1976). At one point in its
life cycle, the parasite is ingested by ants. Up to 50 parasites are ingested at once; but only
one ultimately goes suicidal to alter the behaviour of the ant, causing the host to ‘spend
large amounts of time fastened by its mandibles onto the tips of grass blades, a location
that obviously facilitates being eaten by livestock [the next step of the parasite’s life cycle]’
(Wilson, 1977a).
Some degree of kin selection is needed to retain such suicide (Wilson, 1977a). For
D. dendriticum, ‘predators’ are not feared, but welcomed. Moreover, in the D. dendriticum
system, predators are passive; they do not make zero-sum choices between groups based on
probable group genotypes (nor could they), they simply eat what they encounter. Changing
the absolute probability of encounter (group extinction, not being eaten, measured by
[1 − ρN], [1 − ρS]) is not sufficient for our S to evolve; the predator must actively evaluate
information provided by groups (αi, j; weakly altruistic signals provided by group (abstract)
peripheral S’s) to avoid (personally) unwanted outcomes. Because signalling potential
suicide (for the parasite to attract predators exclusively) cannot be present in the parasite’s
natural history, kin selection is mandatory for the evolution of altruism.
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There is no a priori reason to restrict inverse behavioural correlations (mechanisms
detailing unique, divergent roles among group-mates) to kin (Kukuk et al., 1998; Rissing et al., 1989;
Pollock, 1994b, 1995, 1996; Pollock et al., 2004). Abandoning the notion that random assortment
necessarily implies behavioural autonomy among individuals absent coercion (Aumann and
Maschler, 1972; Rosenthal, 1974; Aumann, 1987; Pollock, 1994a), we find herein that the scope of altruism
under strong, truncating trait group selection is considerably greater than heretofore
considered possible. We have focused on reproductive suicide as the most stringent form
of strong altruism; clearly, weaker sacrifice will fare better, and we expect, generally, these
latter to be most likely revealed in nature. But empirical cases may be hard to detect
when suicide or weaker forms are fundamentally contingent. Prior theory may also cloud
recognition of such sacrifice among non-relatives [e.g. predator mobbing in birds (Caraco et al.,
1980; Rainey et al., 2004)], labelling some altruism as aberrant, evolutionarily ephemeral or
misinterpreted (e.g. Atran, 2003). Measures of strong, truncated trait group selection, mediated
by predation, may reveal unexpected adaptation where aberrant failure now apparently
resides.
Strategic suicide, not suicidal strategy
In our extreme model, S codes for two options, one actively suicidal, the other passively
personally beneficial. Predators determine which is experienced, acting, from the
perspective of a focal S individual, as a randomization mechanism yielding suicide or
personal success. This randomization is not, however, identical to a standard randomized
strategy (Aumann and Maschler, 1972; Maynard Smith, 1982; Pollock, 1994a), for the personally beneficial S
outcome is possible only because the suicidal S outcome is regularly realized, entraining
predators to avoid groups with ‘louder’ pre-suicidal commitment. Contrast a binary
randomized strategy that codes for success in, say, wet versus dry years. In a wet year,
randomizing to dry may cause personal death, but such death does not directly enhance the
absolute fitness, present or future, of those happening to randomize to wet. ‘Dry’ does not
suicidally aid ‘wet’ by being ‘dry’ in wet years. A standard randomized strategy may have
some personally disastrous outcomes akin to suicide, but such outcomes are born solely
because other outcomes are beneficial, not because the beneficial outcome requires the
presence of failure in others. In a wet year, ‘wet’ does well whether ‘dry’ is present or not.
Ostensible suicidal outcomes do not imply suicidal altruism; zero-sum coordination among
outcomes via common strategy is key.
S, while not suicidal as a strategy, employs suicide to enhance its population-wide success.
One might be tempted to say S risks suicide in the hope of the alternative passive gain. But
one could equally say that S risks the passive gain in the hope of (predator randomized)
suicide. Both outcomes are essential for S’s stability, suicide feeding back onto passive gain,
unlike the wet/dry year gamble. Here privileging personal gain confuses strategy survival
with individual, contingent survival, masking the mechanism of selection (Pollock, 1988, 1994a;
Pollock et al., 2004). The ‘selfish gene’ is not the selfish individual. While a successful strategy
must be selfish, encoding mechanisms that ensure its evolutionary persistence (Dawkins, 1982),
these mechanisms may induce extreme sacrifice even without kin selection. And it is that
extreme sacrifice that phenotypes actually experience (Aumann and Maschler, 1972; Pollock, 1994a).
Strategy S is not suicidal; but this is immaterial to the S that experiences suicide.
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